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Finley‟s assertion that “money was essentially coined metal and nothing else” still 
enjoys wide support from scholars
1
. The problems with this view have often been noted. 
Coins were only available in a limited supply and large payments could not be carried 
out with any convenience. Travelling with large sums in coins posed both practical and 
security problems. To quote just one often cited example, Cicero‟s purchase of his 
house on the Palatine Hill for 3.5 million sesterces would have required 3.4 tons of 
silver denarii
2
.  
Various solutions have been proposed : payments in kind or by means of bullion, 
bank money, transfer of debt notes or sale credit. Most of these combine a functional 
view of money („money is what money does‟) with the basic belief that coinage in the 
ancient world was the sole dominant monetary instrument, with others remaining 
„second-best‟ alternatives3. 
Starting from such premises, research has focused on identifying and assessing the 
possible alternative instruments to effectuate payments. Typical research questions are 
for instance the commonness (or not) of giro payments, the development (or 
underdevelopment) of financial instruments, the monetary nature (or not) of ancient 
debt notes, the commonness (or not) of payments in kind, and so forth. Despite 
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numerous and intensive studies into ancient monetary and financial systems, there is 
very little agreement on any of these questions
4
. 
Another popular approach to money in the ancient world, has been that of 
quantification. The quantity of the available money supply (in coinage, bullion or other 
forms) is generally considered an important factor of economic development. We will 
never know the exact amount of coinage minted, but hoard evidence, die studies and 
mining data at least allow estimating orders of magnitude in the evolution of the 
currency stock through time. Nevertheless, here too uncertainty remains. Results have 
been rejected on methodological grounds and particularly the amount and the role of 
gold currency – poorly documented in hoards – is highly uncertain5. 
The social nature of money, however, has as yet hardly been systematically 
analysed. The value of money may or may not be upheld by law and specialised 
institutions, in normal situations its circulation is based upon the self-evident 
assumption that it will be generally accepted as a means of payment and discharge of 
obligations. People accept money because they take it for granted that others in turn will 
accept it from them at more or less the same rate. Although legal tender laws may 
provide an ultimate guarantee, the taken-for-granted aspect of money does not derive 
from government intervention. The enforcement costs would simply be too high if 
money users refused to comply with this unwritten „rule‟ of social conduct6. In deeply 
monetized societies social actors are tacitly and explicitly taught that specific social 
settings (for instance market exchanges) require money for exchanges and transactions 
to occur and that we can and should accept „money‟ in exchange for goods and services. 
Structural or deep monetization, therefore, may be seen as the result of processes of 
socialisation (or acculturation), that are mostly context-specific and dynamic. Social 
rules differ depending on the relevant social context and pose different sets of 
constraints to social actors. The impact of socialisation as the determinant factor of 
monetized societies is nicely illustrated by Radford‟s famous study of the spontaneous 
economic organisation of a German P.O.W. camp during the second world war. 
Radford‟s article showed how cigarettes rapidly and spontaneously developed into the 
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dominant currency used for purchases and the valuation of items. The study is 
commonly as an example of how money and markets „naturally‟ emerge if humans are 
allowed privately to own and exchange scarce resources. What Radford‟s study in 
reality shows is that people who grow up in a monetized culture are socially 
predisposed to structure their transactions on a monetary basis even when they lack the 
instruments to which they are accustomed
7
. 
Socialisation is not a static phenomenon. Secondary or anticipatory socialization 
may occur later in a person‟s life and need not pertain to all social contexts. A good 
example for us is offered by Aart‟s study of the „monetization‟ of the Batavians, who 
argues that the Batavian auxiliaries used coins for market exchanges in the Roman(ised) 
contexts of army camps, vici and the civitas‟s capital (Nijmegen), but mostly for ritual 
or ceremonial purposes in their rural homesteads. In the latter instance the coins did not 
function as money, in the former they did
8
. 
Because socialisation processes are context-specific and dynamic, the self-evident 
acceptability of money as a social construct is not absolute. Different social settings 
may require or exclude specific forms of money. Market settings provide the 
archetypical situations that require money, whereas social reciprocity relations, such as 
instrumental friendships and patron client relations preclude payments in money 
(although gifts of money are legitimate). Thus, social institutions determine the degree 
to which and the settings in which specific forms of money are required or excluded. 
They create constraints and possibilities to effect transactions that are perceived as 
„objective‟ or material realities by social actors. In terms of New Institutional 
Economics, money should belong in the realm of structure, not performance. Whereas 
the concept of „property (rights)‟ serves as the prime institution underlying economic 
actions, „money‟ as a social construct may be studied as a social institution structuring 
the transfer of property rights and entitlements
9
. 
Therefore, instead of analyzing various exchange media and their circulation to 
establish whether and to what extent they function as money, we should analyze how 
social interactions in specific settings are institutionalized into monetary transactions, 
and which instruments and procedures are available to effectuate these transactions. I 
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shall here use the term „monetary modes‟ to indicate various combinations of 
instruments and procedures to handle monetized transactions. 
By the time of the late Republic Roman society was deeply monetized. In Roman 
eyes „civilised‟ society could not function on a non-monetary basis. According to elite 
authors the use of „barter‟ was characteristic of barbaric peoples, while civilised people 
relied on money
10
. Indeed, for many parts of the empire Romanisation implied 
monetization
11
. Papyri confirm that even in small rural villages, money was the norm, 
barter the exception. The use of metal detectors has drastically altered the old view that 
coinage was largely absent on rural sites
12
. 
Coinage, however, is merely an instrument to conduct monetized transactions and 
although it proved very successful it was not the oldest instrument nor was it ever the 
only one. Institutional monetization means that transactions are structurally monetized; 
that they are expressed and handled in monetary terms, even in the absence of money 
stricto sensu. Thus, the often cited definitions in Roman law that pecunia could refer to 
anything, whether mobile or immobile, objects or rights, reflects the need for legal 
solutions in cases where transactions or obligations that were structurally or legally 
„monetized‟ were handled by instruments other than coins. It does not imply that 
anything could be used to replace coins at any time if necessary, but that the legal 
regulations remained the same even when the transacting parties agreed to use other 
instruments than coins
13
.Thus, institutionally monetized transactions continue to be 
monetized transactions even when the actors are forced to use substitute exchange 
media not enjoying general acceptability or to use credit arrangements.  
Monetization modes : a model 
Hopkins saw the Roman economy functioning on five intersecting planes : natural 
economy (moneyless), bronze, silver, gold and credit. In his view the monetary 
economy was a „thin veneer of sophistication spread over and tied to the subsistence 
economy‟. The mass of the population were peasants who „produced most of what they 
consumed and consumed most of what they produced‟14. Quantitatively Hopkins is 
probably right, even though his estimate of 80-90% may be too high. The „veneer-
model‟ has nevertheless been criticised because it ignores the structural and 
technological dependence of subsistence production on markets. Peasants working on 
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leased plots of land had to pay rents, tools had to be bought on markets, and so forth. 
Hopkins acknowledges this, but downplays its importance to the point of declaring it 
irrelevant. De Ligt‟s study of peasant markets, clearly showed how these were 
structurally integrated into the money economy
15
. 
More important for our purposes is that Hopkins‟s „planes‟ view of the Roman 
money economy, ignores essential aspects of how the Roman monetary system worked. 
We need a model that expresses the interlocking of institutionalised transaction modes. 
The model I propose here distinguishes three monetary modes, each divided into 
submodes.  
Firstly the currency mode : This was no doubt the most familiar payment mode and 
served as the primary mental model for the use of „money‟ to the Roman mind because 
coins had a fixed face value in terms of monetary units of value. This is why Roman 
jurists defined coins as pretium, not merx
16
. Within the currency mode, we can 
distinguish between gold, silver and bronze denominations. Each of these were favoured 
within specific settings and thus constituted submodes.  
Secondly the commodity mode : this relies on the transfer of commodities to 
extinguish obligations expressed in monetary terms. Within the commodity mode we 
may distinguish between bullion, which had a historically privileged relation to 
currency, and other commodities (grain, oil, wine, ...) 
Thirdly the account mode : in this mode monetary obligations are extinguished or 
diminished by transferring or balancing debt claims. „Accounts‟ here do not presuppose 
a formalised accounting system, but merely a registration system for debts and credits. 
The debt notes (nomina) in question are essentially financial instruments, not monetary 
instruments because they do not enjoy general acceptability as money. However, the 
account mode provides procedures to use them nevertheless to effect monetized 
transactions.  
Within the account mode, we may again distinguish three submodes : private 
account (or debt) rationing, internal account rationing and bank account rationing. 
Private account rationing occurs between social actors that are directly involved in 
transactions. Thus for instance merchants or trading partners may prefer to „balance‟ 
their accounts on a more or less periodical basis. Alternatively, debt claims on a third 
party may be transferred from one partner to the other.  
Internal account rationing occurs within large organisations that are confronted with 
various obligations between members or constituent parts of the organisation. A good 
example is the Roman army. Soldiers rarely received their full pay in cash. Rather each 
soldier had an account with the military administration from which he could draw cash 
or with which he could make purchases of army supplied goods
 
(cf. infra).  
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The most advanced form of account mode is based on bank accounts and giro 
transfer. This differs from private account rationing because a third institution (the 
bank) is involved, which offers its services on a commercial, professional basis. 
Bankers accept deposits with which they handle payment orders. Each depositor has an 
account which can be indebted or to which new deposits may be added. Account 
payments and receipts can then be made by the banker on behalf of his clients. By 
indebting or crediting accounts, payments and loans between clients may handled. 
These then no longer need to concern themselves with the insecurity involved in 
assessing each other‟s liabilities as in private debt rationing, because only the banker‟s 
liability matters.  
Each of the above monetary „modes‟ provides instruments and procedures to handle 
monetized transactions. The efficiency of the monetary system as a whole, defined as 
the number of monetized transactions it can support, depends on the availability of 
monetary and financial instruments, the flexibility and efficiency of the procedures used 
and the ease with which one mode may be substituted for another. 
Currency 
The currency mode was the most „basic‟ mode to conduct monetized payments in 
the ancient world. It was based on a purely monetary instrument the acceptance of 
which was very wide-spread and was legally enforced : coins. The range of available 
denominations (in the Augustan system from quadrans to aureus) was sufficiently wide 
to cover any transaction necessary. Local coinages and imitations provided for regional 
variations.  
Despite some broad definitions of pecunia by Roman jurists, there can be little 
doubt that coinage was to a Roman mind the only form of „real‟ money. In a very direct 
way coins were pretium, not merx
17
.Until late Antiquity, when ghost currency denarii 
communes became the standard for expressing monetary transactions, coinage provided 
the standard for handling monetary transactions. 
The difficulties involved in using the currency mode were mostly of a material 
nature. In some parts of the empire, particularly in the first century AD, the supply of 
small(er) denominations was insufficient. This may be surmised from the massive 
presence in the western provinces of coins that were cut in half and the large numbers of 
imitations. To what extent these local strategies solved the problem is impossible to 
know. By and large, however, local emissions (in the east) and government controlled 
shipments (in the west) seem to have alleviated the problem. 
The main problem that may have posed itself has already been noted at the outset of 
this paper : the clumsiness of coins to make large payments and to transport over longer 
distances. I will return to the safety aspects later. The clumsiness was real, but should 
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not be exaggerated. The transport and security costs involved in making large payments, 
were marginal to the sums in question. A supplementary cost of 1,000 sesterces on a 
payment of 1 million sesterces (more than enough to hire a pack of mules and a well 
armed escort for several weeks) would have represented an additional costof only a 
mere 0.001%. After the introduction of the aureus under Caesar, 1 million sesterces 
could have been paid by 10,000 aurei weighing a total of c. 79 kg. 
Payments of 3.5 million sesterces, as in the case of Cicero‟s house, were infrequent 
and were mostly limited to a small elite group of aristocrats and government officials. 
The recorded 65 sums in the tablets of the Sulpicii from Puteoli range from 450 to 
130,000 sesterces, with a median of 11,000 sesterces. Even the largest sum would 
require only 1300 aurei weighing slightly over 10 kgs
18
. 
The practical difficulties involved in handling large sums in coins were further 
alleviated by deposit bankers (argentarii, trapezitai), that were ubiquitous throughout 
the empire. By far most attested payment orders through bankers, imply the handling of 
cash payments out of deposited sums, or the receipt of payments on behalf of their 
clients
19
. Whatever else Roman bankers may have done, their contribution to the 
currency mode of payments cannot be overestimated. Bankers throughout the empire 
profoundly determined how monetized transactions occurred. Most notably they created 
the possibility of absentee payments, relieving their clients from the burden involved in 
hand-to-hand payments.  
Herodes Atticus used accounts with professional bankers to pay the legacy his father 
had bequeathed to each Athenian citizen, deducting their outstanding debts to him from 
the 5 minae they received from the bequest. The case does not imply that Herodes 
Atticus previously had deposit accounts with these bankers as Harris believes, but 
documents the use of deposit bankers to assist in a huge cash payment operation
20
. 
Thus, the contribution of deposit bankers to the monetary system as an economic 
structure itself may be related to the abundance of metallic currency and the practical 
difficulties involved in handling large currency payments. Deposit bankers changed the 
conditions under which the currency supply could be used. Presumably, many „bank 
accounts‟ originated from payment orders that for various reasons remained temporarily 
„uncollected‟. We will return to the possible other uses of these accounts later.  
„Coined money‟ (pecunia numerata) enjoyed some preference even as medium for 
wealth storage. Galba is said by Suetonius always to have travelled with a coach 
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carrying one million sesterces in gold, no doubt guarded by an armed escort
21
.When 
Cicero considered buying horti in 45 BC, he informed Atticus that he had 600,000 
sesterces in cash
22
. Pliny the Younger is often cited as a senator whose fortune consisted 
partly in credit bonds. But the letter in question deals with the purchase of an estate, for 
which Pliny needed 3 million sesterces. Although he admits having invested almost his 
entire fortune in land and the rest („a little bit‟) in interest bearing loans, he is confident 
that he can use his mother-in-law‟s cash-box (arca) as his own. The implication is that 
this lady held huge cash reserves
23
.  
Duncan Jones estimated the total coinage supply around the middle of the second 
century at c. 21,000 million sesterces, of which 12,000 million in gold, 7,000 in silver 
and 2,000 million in bronze
24
. Hopkins guestimated GDP as probably less than 18,000 
million sesterces
25
 Using these figures as starting points Wim Jongman argued that the 
Roman coinage supply in the early Empire was extremely high compared to the 
Empire‟s GDP, possibly even larger that the latter26. 
I am very sceptical of these guestimates. At the very least notional error margins of 
50% should be added
27
. Nevertheless, no matter how faulty the actual figures may be, 
two general conclusions remain standing : The Roman coinage supply in the early 
Empire was abundant
28
 and most of this (probably over 50%) was in aurei
29
. 
The abundance of high value gold coinage may explain why the use of gold bullion 
as money is – for the high empire – hardly documented. Currency was in abundant 
supply mainly because so many aurei were minted during the civil wars and (to judge 
by stray finds) in the first century AD. However, the importance of the imperial gold 
coinage is also illuminating for the Republican monetary system, when no gold was 
minted. Hopkins estimated the money stock in the late Republic at approximately 
1,600-2,000 million sesterces. I have argued elsewhere why I think this figure is too 
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low, but even under the most optimistic estimates, it cannot be more than doubled 
credibly and it is unlikely to have increased much under the Julio-Claudians since hoard 
evidence indicates that approximately half of the silver money stock when Vespasian 
came to power still consisted of old Republican denarii
30
. So this leaves us with an 
order of magnitude of about 2,000-3,500 million sesterces in silver coin. Taxes in the 
fifties BC would have yielded 340 million sesterces, Caesar alone is said to have 
accumulated debts up to 20 million sesterces, Q. Considius had 15 million sesterces 
outstanding, Cicero‟s house on the Palatine cost 3.5 million sesterces ... Clearly, the 
stock of silver coins alone cannot have been enough to supply enough money to handle 
monetized transactions. In the imperial period gold currency provided the solution, in 
the republican period gold bullion probably fulfilled the same role.  
We must turn now to the question of how robust currency was as „general purpose 
money‟. Could any denomination be used in any transaction ? What were the 
transaction costs involved in changing denominations? How easily could currency be 
changed for bullion and vice versa? 
In theory all currency denominations in the Principate were inter-connected at 
legally fixed rates. One aureus equalled 25 denarii, or 100 sesterces, or 400 asses and 
so forth. Although the 3
rd
 century currency crisis clearly put great strains on the system, 
and may have shattered official rates in practice, the fixed relation between gold, silver 
and other denominations was given up only in late Antiquity. However, this fixed 
relationship was not so fixed. Gold, silver and bronze denominations each had their own 
transaction spheres and although in theory payments could be made in any 
denomination, the choice was not altogether free
31
. 
In Asia the denarius was officially valued as 16 assaria
32
. However, in Pergamon 
exchange bankers were licensed by the city in exchange for a commission fee on their 
profits, to buy denarii for 17 assaria and sell them for 18. A conflict arose when the 
bankers, in collaboration with the agoranomoi, began charging a fictitious agio on sales 
of fish paid in denarii. Hadrian eventually intervened prohibiting the exchange bankers 
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Dalmatian mines. A notional 15,000 million +/- 50% for the mid 2
nd
 century, to account for Dacian war 
booty and subsequent gold mining in that region.The stress each time should be on notional and +/- 50%. 
31
 Cf. K. VERBOVEN, Demise and fall of the Augustan currency system, in O. HEKSTER & G. DE 
KLEIJN & D. SLOOTJES (eds.), Crisis and the Roman Empire (Impact of Empire 7), Leiden – Boston, 
2007, p. 245-257. M. H. CRAWFORD, op. cit. [n. 12], p. 43.  
32
 IGRR IV, 915 (= Melville Jones 374) (Cibyra, AD 74); IG XII,5 no. 659 ; 663 ; 664 ; 665 (Syros). 
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to charge the agio, but decreed that sales of small fish – even in bulk – had to be paid in 
assaria, which the dealers could then exchange at the rate of 17 assaria for a denarius
33
.  
An inscription from Ephesus recording an endowment considered the denarius as 
the equivalent of 18 assaria and made a special provision if the exchange commission 
(kollubos) would rise. Presumably the endowment was established in denarii, but the 
handouts were to be paid in assaria
34
. 
A writing tablet from Alburnus Maior in Dacia, from 167 CE, implies an exchange 
rate of 20 asses for a denarius, while another implies the existence of a denomination or 
combination of denominations valued as 1/24 of a denarius
35
. 
Under the Ptolemies in Egypt surcharges were customary when payments expressed 
in silver were made in bronze, or payments expressed in gold were made in silver
36
. 
According to the Gnomon of the Idios Logos it was illegal under Roman rule to change 
„a coin ... for more than it is worth in small change‟ 37 . But papyri show that the 
tetradrachm circulated at rates fluctuating between 24 to 30 bronze obols, while in 
official transactions a rate of 28 to 30 was customary
38
. The nominal value of the aureus 
was 100 Egyptian drachmae. But a papyrus dating to c. 108 CE notes that the aureus 
(chrusous) was sold for 11 (silver) drachmae, whereas it used be sold for 15 (silver) 
drachmae
39
. 
Scaevola discusses the case of a banker acknowledging to his client that he owed 
him 380,000 sesterces plus interest and a separate sum in aurei (summa aureorum) 
                                                 
 
33
 OGIS 484 (= Melville Jones 579); cf. R. BOGAERT, op. cit. [n. 20], p. 231-234. 
34
 Ancient Greek inscriptions in the British Museum, III, 481, ll. 144-148; (and commentary Newton 
ibid., p. 138, 141) 
35
 CIL III, p. 950 (p 1058, 2215) (= FIRA III, p. 481-482, no. 157) ; CIL III, p. 953 (p. 1058) See M. 
H. Crawford, op. cit. [n. 12], p. 43. 
36
 S. VON REDEN, The politics of monetization in third-century BC Egypt, in A. MEADOWS & K. 
SHIPTON (eds.), Money and its uses in the ancient Greek World, Oxford – New York, 2001, p. 70 ; S. VON 
REDEN, op. cit. [n. 19]; cf. P.Cair.Zen 59022, 11-20 (258/257 BC); PTeb. III 2 890, 14, 166, 229 (173-
130/128 BC) cf.. R. BOGAERT, Les banques affermées Ptolémaïques, in Historia 33, 1984, p. 186. 
37
 S. RICCOBONO, Il gnomon des Idios Logos, Palermo, 1950, p. 246-247 ; W. G. UXKULL-
GYLLENBAND, Der Gnomon des Idios Logos, 2. T. : Der Kommentar, Berlin, 1934, p. 103-104 ; L. C. 
WEST & A. C. JOHNSON, Currency in Roman and Byzantine Egypt, Princeton, 1944, p. 182. 
38
 D. RATHBONE, Prices and price formation in Roman Egypt, J. ANDREAU & P. BRIANT & R. 
DESCAT (edd.), Economie antique. Prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiques, Saint-
Bertrand-de-Comminges, 1997, p. 189. 
39
 P.Bad. 37 = P.Sarap 90, cf. also P.Sarap 89c. See W. WEISER, Nomisma exitelon und nummi 
restituti. Die Währungspolitik des Traianus (98-117) in Realität und moderner Fiktion, in ZPE 125, 1999, 
p. 236 ; K. STROBEL, Geldwesen und Währungsgeschichte des Imperium Romanum im Spiegel der 
Entwicklung des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr., in K. STROBEL (ed.), Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum. 
Strukturen, Modelle und Wertungen im Spannungsfeld von Modernismus und Neoprimitivismus, Stuttgart 
2002, p. 90; L. C. WEST & A. C. JOHNSON, op. cit. [n. 37], p. 90-91 believe the price is that of gold 
bullion, but this is contradicted by the adjective chrusous; see also convincingly J. SCHWARTZ, Les 
archives de Sarapion et de ses fils, Cairo, 1961, no. 90 (= P.Sarap) 
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which would be returned without interest. Apparently the banker kept separate accounts 
for sums in gold and sums in aes or silver
40
. 
Paulus asserts that a creditor could not be forced to accept payment in a different 
„form‟ of coins if this would be to his detriment. Wolters believes this refers to 
„Provinzialprägungen‟. However, Paulus‟ is clearly speaking of coins enjoying „legal 
tender‟ and it seems unlikely that provincial emissions enjoyed such legal tender empire 
wide. Whatever the coins Paulus is thinking of, his view implies a difference between 
face value and exchange value
41
. 
Aurei were not only more convenient to make large payments, they were also more 
prestigious
42
. The patrons and quinquennales perpetui of the corporation of fishermen 
and divers in Rome, received one aureus each at a handout in the early 3
rd
 century. 
Common magistrates in charge received the formal equivalent of 25 denarii
43
. Claudius 
Paulinus, governor of Britain in AD 220 honoured his protégé Sennius Sollemnis by 
paying his salary in gold – a fact which was duly recorded on the inscription set up in 
his honour
44
. 
These few examples – which could be expanded – illustrate how monetized 
transactions conducted in the currency mode were subject to constraints concerning the 
preferred metal in which the transaction should be handled. This preference could stem 
from various reasons, ranging from a purely practical nature (gold is easier to transport, 
copper to buy a loaf of bread), to status reasons. It did not preclude payment in another 
metal, but was real enough to provide a „market‟ for inter-currency exchanges and 
justified demanding surcharges. 
I have argued elsewhere how the success of the Augustan currency system, which 
successfully integrated coins in various metals from fiduciary bronze to high value gold, 
was thanks to the tension-buffering capacity of inter-currency commissions and 
premiums that allowed fluctuations in the demand and supply of denominations in 
various metals to be smoothed out
45
. 
                                                 
 
40
 Dig. II, 14, 47, 1; the banker‟s letter refers to summa aureorum quam … not aureos quos, therefore 
we are dealing with an open deposit (depositum irregulare) not a closed deposit (depositum regulare); cf. 
K. VERBOVEN, Faeneratores, negotiatores and financial intermediation in the Roman world (late 
Republic and early Empire), in K. VERBOVEN & K. VANDORPE & V. CHANKOWSKI-SABLE (edd.), Pistoi 
dia tèn technèn. Bankers, loans and archives in the ancient World. Studies in honour of Raymond 
Bogaert, Leuven, 2008, p. 229.  
41
 Dig.XLVI, 3, 99. Note that aliam formam covers more than merely the metal (weight and/or 
purity) of the coins (contra M. H. CRAWFORD, Finance, coinage and money from the Severans to 
Constantine, in ANRW 2.2, 1975, p. 566) ; R. WOLTERS, Nummi Signati. Untersuchungen zur römischen 
Münzprägung und Geldwirtschaft, München, 1999, p. 359. 
42
 S. MROZEK, À propos du “marbre de Thorigny”, salarium in auro (CIL 13, 3162), in Bulletin de la 
Société Française de Numismatique, 1973, p. 335-336. 
43
 CIL VI, 29700 ; S. MROZEK, Les espèces monétaires dans les inscriptions latines du Haut-Empire, 
in Les dévaluations à Rome. Vol. I (Actes Rome 1975), Rome, 1978, p. 85. 
44
 CIL XIII, 3162. cf. H. DEVIJVER, Prosopographia militiarum equestrium quae fuerunt ab Augusto 
ad Gallienum, Leuven, 1976-2001, II, p. 729-730, IV, p. 1718. 
45
 K. VERBOVEN, op. cit. [n. 31]. 
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The Augustan system held out surprisingly long. It gradually eroded after the 
Severan era, but it took quite a long time before the currency crisis turned into a 
monetary crisis. The main event of the third century currency crisis was probably not 
the devaluation of the silver money (although of course the effects of this should not be 
underestimated), but the gradual brake-away of the gold coinage from the currency 
system. Presumably, inter-currency premiums and surcharges first increased, then as 
gold coin weight standards became more erratic, exchange premiums and surcharges 
themselves were linked to the weight of individual gold coins used. Gold currency 
gradually degraded back into bullion although its link with imperial authority may have 
ensured its special status. The degradation of the gold coinage was reversed by 
Diocletian and Constantine, but in the currency system which emerged in the fourth 
century its relation to silver and bronze coinage was fundamentally altered. 
Commodity mode 
The instruments used in commodity mode payments are (obviously) commodities; 
objects for which there exists an independent demand not derived from their potential 
use as media of exchange, such as raw materials (iron, bullion, hides, ...), articles of 
consumption (grain, wine, ...), ostentatious display (jewellery, precious metal objects, 
...), utensils and tools (spits, cauldrons, knives, spades, arrow heads ...), and so forth. 
Although commodities never originate as monetary instruments, they can acquire 
monetary features if their acceptability in handling monetized transactions
46
 becomes 
common and socially prescribed. When this happens „commodity money‟ comes into 
existence. Historically this may be observed in a wide variety of cultures and epoch, 
among which most notably the ancient Near East and Egypt, and the dark age Greek 
world.  
In some cases the monetary nature of commodity money ultimately prevailed upon 
its commodity nature. This is clearly visible for instance in Chinese „spade‟ and „knife‟ 
money from the Warring States Period (5
th
 c. – 221 BC) which is shaped like knives and 
spades, but cannot be used as such
47
. Similarly, iron spits (obeloi) from dark age and 
archaic Greece, seem to have been produced from deliberately inferior iron
48
. For our 
purposes, it should be noted that in this view (my view) „monetization‟ first occurs in 
the emergence of new social relations when transactions become institutionally 
monetized. The monetization of commodities is a response to these changes in the 
structure of social relations. 
How routinely were commodities used to handle monetized transactions in the 
Roman world ? Before answering this question we should realise that „deep 
                                                 
 
46
 That is transactions in which values and obligations are expressed in quantities of reference 
commodities or (in some cases) money stricto sensu, cf. infra for the use of bullion. 
47
 Cf. W. SCHEIDEL, The divergent evolution of coinage in eastern and western Eurasia, in W. V. 
HARRIS (ed.), The monetary systems of the Greeks and Romans, Oxford, 2008, p. 267-285. 
48
 Cf. D. M. SCHAPS, The invention of coinage and the monetization of Ancient Greece. Ann Arbor, 
2004, p. 63-92 
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monetization‟ does not imply full monetization. Deep monetization refers to the 
institutionalisation of money in social fields that are structurally important for the social 
system. It does not imply that all societal contexts required exchanges to be structured 
through money. 
No pre-industrial economy ever came near to being fully monetized. Gift exchange, 
command economics and redistribution remained important structuring principles that 
governed the flow of resources in ancient and other pre-industrial societies. Money 
maybe drawn into gift-exchange practices (as gifts and free loans) and command and 
redistribution systems, but the presence of money as such does not imply that 
transactions were monetized. Thus for instance the large number of Roman Republican 
denarii found in hoards in Romania does not imply that the indigenous economy there 
was monetized
49
. 
Although monetized transactions may in some cases be handled in kind rather than 
by currency or account practices, not every transaction in kind is a hidden monetized 
transaction. Barter is a clumsy way of doing business, but the line between gift-
exchange (based on ideally enduring personal relations) and tit-for-tat barter 
transactions (based on reciprocal wants) is not clear cut. Sahlin‟s distinction between 
generalised reciprocity, balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity is worth keeping 
in mind here
50
. In small face-to-face communities informal barter (swapping things) no 
doubt occurred side by side with gift-exchange, whereas gift exchanges between 
unrelated groups may be little more than disguised barter transactions
51
. 
Roman jurists long discussed the difference or similarity between barter 
(permutatio) and purchase (emptio venditio). By the late 2
nd
 c. AD the restrictive view 
prevailed which strictly separated permutatio (barter) from emptio venditio
52
. However, 
this discussion mainly served legal purposes. Emptio venditio was a legally binding 
consensual contract. If a transaction in kind qualified as a purchase, then it was subject 
to the legal rules regulating emptio venditio. 
There is little doubt that in the Roman World of the late Republic and early Empire 
commodities played an accessory, but important role in various payments (sales, wages, 
rents, ...) and wealth storage. Grain in particular was a common tax-payment medium 
and was often given as rations or as supplement to a wage in money. In Egypt its use for 
wealth storage is recorded
53
. 
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 M. H. CRAWFORD, Republican denarii in Romania : the suppression of piracy and the slave-trade, 
in JRS , 67? 1977? p. 117-124; 
50
 M. SAHLINS, Stone age economics, Chicago – New York, 1972, p. 149-230. 
51
 Cf. the Carthaginian trade on AfriCa described by Herodotus, IV, 197. 
52
 See D.B. HOLLANDER, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 8-11 ; cf. Cf. M. KASER, Das römische Privatrecht, (= 
Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 10 Abt., Rechtsgeschichte des Altertums 3.T., 3. Bd.), München, 
1971, p. 458, 484 ; Gaius III,141 ; Dig. XVIII, 1, 1 ; XIX, 4, 1 On permutatio : Dig. XIX, 5, 5, 1 
53
 On grain and other commodities as „means of payment‟ see CHR. HOWGEGO, op. cit. [n. 5], p. 22-
29. ; D.B. HOLLANDER, op. cit. [n. 1], p. 59-75. 
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Does the use of kind imply a „brake on the level of monetization‟ as Howgego 
believes, or are commodities simply alternative instruments to handle monetized 
transactions ? If they do belong to a different „transactional order‟, how is this related to 
monetized transactions ? Is there an articulation of monetary transactions modes with 
non-monetary transaction modes (gift-exchange, barter, taxes and retributions in kind, 
...)? 
Von Reden argued that in Ptolemaic Egypt grain served as a substitute for coinage 
to compensate the scarcity of metals. The use of grain as a monetary medium was much 
older in Egypt than the introduction of coinage by Alexander and the first Ptolemies. 
But whatever the prehistory of grain as a standard of value and medium of exchange, 
under the Ptolemies it was integrated into a coherent monetized system that hinged upon 
metal coinage
54
. Under Roman rule monetization progressed and the role of currency 
seems to have increased, but the use of commodities to handle transactions was never 
wholly abandoned. Egyptian banks are recorded holding deposits and making 
„payments‟ in kind and the absence of similar attestations elsewhere for Roman 
argentarii is probably due to the nature of our source material
55
. 
Clearly, the Roman empire was not fully monetized. Taxes could be levied in 
money or in kind, but particularly since the third century AD they could also be 
expressed in kind and paid in money (adaeratio). Adaeratio does not indicate a return to 
a non-monetised economy, since contrary the system presupposes that the value of 
products could routinely be expressed in monetary terms
56
. Nevertheless, taxes 
(expressed) in kind are fundamentally non-monetary obligations. The practice of 
adaeratio shows a concern to provide an easy transfer mode to change from payments 
in kind to payment in money. It shows that the institution of taxes in kind was itself 
linked to the monetized economy and thus that the imperial fiscal system was both 
flexible and coherent, but it does not support the claim that the imperial fiscal system 
was essentially a monetary system. 
To interpret grain and similar commodities used for tax payments and other 
transactions as „commodity money‟ is misleading. Obviously commodities like grain 
were used in ways that limited the need for (other) monetary instruments, but they are 
rarely attested as monetary instruments themselves of which the acceptance could be 
                                                 
 
54
 S. VON REDEN, op. cit. [n. 36], p. 73 : „The relative scarcity of precious-metal coinage on the one 
hand and the attempt of the state to promote monetization ideologically and practically prompted a variety 
of strategies to create money beyond the available supply of precious metals. One was the introduction of 
a bronze coinage as a medium of payment, another the use of grain as a store of wealth. Beyond these 
strategies a large number of credit operations were deployed whose major function seems to have been to 
compensate for the scarcity of coinage and to increase its speed of circulation‟. See also S. VON REDEN, 
op. cit. [n. 19]. 
55
 See R. BOGAERT, Les opérations en nature des banques en Égypte gréco-romaine, in AncSoc 19, 
1988, p. 213-224; R. BOGAERT, Les opérations des banques de l‟Égypte romaine, in AncSoc 30, 2000, p. 
257-258; J. ANDREAU, Les comptes bancaire en nature, in Patrimoines, échanges et prêts d‟argent, 
Roma, 1997, p. 189-201 (= in Index 15, 1987, p. 413-422). 
56
 On taxation in kind see R. DUNCAN JONES, Structure and scale in the Roman economy, Cambridge, 
1999, p. 187-198. 
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taken for granted. Those on the receiving end could not rely on the possibility of using 
the grain or other commodities to make payments and discharge obligations. Grain or 
other commodities were never used as a standard of value. Monetized transactions in the 
Roman World were as a rule expressed in currency units even though by late Antiquity 
this had become a „ghost currency‟ (the denarius communis)57. 
We should clearly distinguish between „commodity money‟ as a monetary 
instrument on the one hand and the transfer of movables or property as a procedure to 
extinguish monetary obligations on the other hand. The latter was known in Roman law 
(and still is in modern law) as datio in solutum. This was a legally recognized and 
binding procedure to extinguish monetary obligations and could therefore be used to 
support monetized transactions
58
. Datio in solutum clearly contributed to upholding the 
monetary structure of the Roman economy, but to describe the goods used in such 
procedures as „commodity money‟ is to ignore the most fundamental characteristic of 
any monetary instrument, namely its general and socially prescribed acceptability as 
money. Datio in solutum depended on the agreement of parties involved. No creditor 
could be forced to accept payment in kind, no debtor could be forced to pay in kind.  
The most spectacular, but also atypical, instance of datio in solutum as a procedure 
to extinguish monetary obligations is the aestimatio decree which Julius Caesar issued 
in 49 BC. Although the details of the decree are not known, it appears that a debtor 
could apply to the praetor (or governor in the provinces) for a permission to pay off his 
debts by a transfer of property at pre-war prices. If the praetor agreed, the creditor was 
obliged to accept the transfer at the estimated pre-war value
59
. 
Caesar‟s aestimatio decree and the resulting payments in kind, are exceptional 
measures. We simply don‟t know how common payments by aestimatio were in 
ordinary times. An off-hand remark of Cicero concerning the payment numerato (in 
cash) or aestimatione (in kind) of horti he wanted to buy suggests that it was an 
acceptable option – even though Cicero preferred to pay cash. But the case also shows 
that it was up to the vendor (or creditor ?) to decide
60
. 
Although there is plenty of proof that transactions in kind were a familiar feature 
throughout the Roman empire, there is very little to suggest that monetized transactions 
could routinely be handled by using kind as was once suggested by Pekáry
61
. Of course 
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 Cf. W.V. HARRIS, op. cit. [n. 2], p. 196 ; Chr. HOWGEGO, op. cit. [n. 5], p. 30-31. 
58
 Cf. M. KASER, op. cit. [n. 52], p. 533 ; A. BERGER, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (= 
TAPhS n.s. 43-2), Philadelphia, 1953, p. 424 
59
 See C. T. BARLOW, Bankers, moneylenders, and interest rates in the Roman Republic, Ann Arbor 
(Mi.), 1978, p. 186-191; M.W. FREDERIKSEN, Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt, in JRS 56, 1966, 
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 Cicero, Att. XII, 25. Cf. also the case of Ovia‟s payment : Cicero, Att. XII, 21, 4; see also M. 
IOANNATOU, op. cit. [n.59], p. 397. 
61
 Th. PEKÁRY, Les limites de l'économie monétaire à l'époque romaine, in M. CORBIER (ed.), Les 
dévaluations à Rome. Epoque républicaine et 'imperiale'. Vol. 2 (Actes Gdansk, 1978) (Collection Ecole 
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money could be raised by pledging property or possessions, or if necessary by selling, 
but the purpose in that case is to obtain coins and thus to resort to the currency mode. 
Transactions in kind (whether as barter, gift-exchange, wage rations, ...) were in most 
cases structurally different from monetized transactions. Accordingly, the commodity 
mode for handling monetized transactions remained a marginal phenomenon.  
To this conclusion, however, we must note a major exception, viz. bullion. The role 
of bullion is more complicated. Gold, silver and copper had served as monetary 
instruments since the 3
rd
 millennium BC. The oldest institutionally monetized 
transactions known relied on gold, silver and copper, as standards of value and 
exchange media. Coinage derived from this practice in the late 7
th
 c. BC. In many parts 
of the eastern Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East the practice continued for 
many more centuries
62
. Although historically unrelated, Italian monetary history as well 
began with uncoined bronze (aes rude)
63
.  
The role of uncoined gold and (to a lesser extent) silver as wealth storage devices is 
abundantly documented. In the late Republic, the Roman treasury kept large amounts of 
gold, probably in the form of ingots or foreign coins
64
. Private persons too were in the 
habit of keeping much of their wealth in uncoined gold and silver, sometimes in ingots, 
but mostly in the form of plate or jewellery
65
. 
Gold and silver objects were commonly stored together with coins in locked 
cupboards (armaria). Cicero describes how the slave doctor Strato stole some money 
and five pounds of gold from an armarium of his mistress Sassia
66
. Only three out of 
205 late Republican coin hoards from Italy contained gold bars and/or jewellery, only 
one contained a silver bar and one silver ornaments
67
, but this may well be a 
coincidence.  
The question whether bullion could be brought to the Mint to sell or to commission 
it to be coined has been extensively debated, but the lack of any clear evidence of this 
practice makes it doubtful that such procedures were common or standard practice
68
. 
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Like any valuable asset, precious metal objects and ingots could be sold. Prices no 
doubt fluctuated but in view of the fact that currency itself primarily consisted of 
precious metals, these fluctuations could be expected to remain limited
69
. The value of 
gold and silver objects moreover was highly uniform. It was commonly expressed by 
weight, not in sesterces or denarii. This indicates that the costs of making the objects 
were small compared to the value of the material. It also indicates that the market value 
of – and therefore the demand for – the objects was primarily determined by their 
substance, not their function. A gold spoon or goblet was bought because it was gold, 
not because it was a spoon or a goblet. In addition to being easily and uniformly valued, 
precious metal objects were easy to store, easy to transport, imperishable, sanctioned by 
tradition, and last but not least prestigious. In view of all this, it easy to understand why 
gold and silver enjoyed status as preferential commodities over and above other assets. 
Lo Cascio argued that the primary role of gold as a wealth storage device, lay in its 
use as security for loans
70
. Ulpian discusses the case of a creditor who gave his debtor a 
gold bowl or ingot to sell and use the coins. If the sale was concluded a monetary loan 
was established
71
. The passage illustrates how gold could be easily although not 
automatically transferred into a monetary debt. The case reminds us of the anecdote told 
by Plutarch about Antonius Creticus, who would have given a silver bowl to a friend 
who needed money
72
. Another passage in the Digest mentions the deposit of 10 pounds 
and two discs of gold in a sealed bag, which were apparently intended to guarantee or 
pay debts
73
. A tablet from the archive of the Sulpicii from Puteoli records a loan of 5000 
sesterces guaranteed by over 10 pounds of silver in a sealed bag
74
. 
Clearly, gold and silver bullion could easily be used to raise cash, by selling or 
pledging, perhaps even having it coined at the Mint. But, this again is leading us back to 
the currency mode. Was gold or silver bullion also used directly as exchange media ?  
For the Republic there is a wide consensus that gold bullion was used for large 
payments and that both gold and silver plate and bullion served as money in crisis 
                                                                                                                                               
 
citizen. Perhaps we should rephrase the question : was the Roman state at all times prepared to „buy‟ gold 
and silver ?  
69
 Woytek argued that the Republican state fixed an official exchange rate between gold bullion and 
coined silver of 4000 HS to a pound of gold (B. WOYTEK, Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur römischen 
Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v.Chr. (Österreichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Denkschriften 312 = Veröffentlichungen der 
numismatischen Kommission, 40), Wien, 2003, p. 56, n. 195, 268; (see also Th. MOMMSEN Geschichte 
des Römische Münzwesen, Berlin, 1860, p. 402), but even if this is true (there is no positive evidence), it 
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situations
75
. Caelius is said to have borrowed gold from his mistress Clodia. The way in 
which Cicero presents the case implies that it was used directly for payments without 
first selling or pledging it
76
. Rabirius Postumus gave gold to his friend Cicero when the 
latter had to flee Italy
77
. Lucilius refers to a quaestor paying out gold
78
. An interesting 
passage in a letter from Cicero to Atticus refers to gold being used in a large transaction 
on which an exchange-commission (kollubos) had to be paid
79
. 
Legislation regarding monetary questions often associates uncoined gold and 
coinage. The lex Cornelia de falsis applied both to forgery of coins and uncoined gold
80
. 
The decree that Caesar issued in 49 BC against hoarding forbade anyone to hold more 
than 60,000 sesterces in coinage or gold bullion
81
. The senatorial decree of 63 BC 
prohibiting the export of gold or silver clearly targeted both coins and bullion
82
. 
When the senate forbade the export of gold and silver in 63 BC, Cicero ordered his 
quaestor to go to Puteoli to enforce the decision
83
. The implication is that merchants 
used uncoined gold to balance their affairs. It should be noted, however, that the use of 
gold bullion or plate to balance a trade sheet, does not imply that the gold in question 
was subsequently used as money rather sold for money. It has recently been observed, 
that shipwrecks rarely yield substantial amounts of gold, arguing against the use of gold 
bullion by traders
84
.  
For the early Empire, however, there is little reason to assume that gold or silver 
bullion (or plate) was still commonly used to handle monetized transactions. The 
abundance of aurei and the ubiquity of deposit and exchange bankers offered practical 
alternatives. Of course, this does not mean that bullion was not occasionally used, for 
instance to effect a datio in solutum. Gold and silver plate certainly remained highly 
favoured items for wealth storage, that could be easily be sold or pledged to raise cash 
when necessary. But whereas under the Republic uncoined gold had served as a strong 
monetary instrument, enjoying wide and socially prescribed acceptability, the 
introduction of the aureus effectively outstripped uncoined gold from its monetary 
aspects. As we noted before, this situation lasted until the 3
rd
 century currency crisis 
broke away gold coin from the rest of the currency system. 
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Account mode 
The account mode of handling monetized transactions is based on the transfer of 
debt claims to extinguish obligations expressed in monetary terms. The practice is much 
older than coinage and may lie at the origin of money itself. It is clearly attested already 
in the old Babylonian period in the 20
th
 c. BC
85
. The instruments used in the account 
mode are registrations of debts. Underlying the account mode (but not synonymous with 
it), therefore, are credit arrangements.  
Credit is extremely important for a monetized economy to work smoothly. It allows 
the handling of monetized transactions in the absence of currency or bullion by 
introducing a time lag between the receipt and the final settlement. This can take on two 
forms : The supplying party may accept a delay of payment by the receiving party („sale 
credit‟) or the receiving party may turn to a third party (person or institution) to borrow 
the money. The supplying party is then paid immediately, but the receiving party will 
have to pay back the third party creditor at a later date. In both cases (sale credit and 
third party credit) an interest fee may be charged, but this is not always the case. 
Monetization and increased debt rates tend to go hand in hand. Thus, for instance, 
Hollander recently argued that the Catilarian crisis was caused in part by increased 
monetization of the Italian countryside
86
. The reason for this is not just that new 
consumption patterns emerge (they do), but mainly that exchanges which had until then 
been conducted on the basis of gift-exchange or share-cropping, are restructured into 
monetized transaction. Social actors involved in these transactions must get the where-
with-all to pay, in which they are not always successful.  
Debit/credit notes in themselves are not money, they attest procedures to conduct 
monetized transactions when money (coinage, bullion) is temporarily absent or 
insufficient. By doing so credit allows an optimal use of an existing stock of money 
(currency and/or commodity money). In terms of monetary theory it increases the 
„velocity of circulation of money‟, by reducing the amount of money lying idle87. 
Debt claims resemble money in the sense that they signify rights to future goods or 
services, but differ from money sensu stricto because the rights/claims they attest 
cannot be transferred freely. The crucial feature of money we distinguished at the 
outset, viz. its socially institutionalised acceptability is lacking. Whereas money is the 
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anonymous embodiment of unspecified rights, debt notes merely represent specified 
claims on specified persons or organisations. 
This restriction, however, is not absolute. Throughout history various procedures 
have been developed to make debt claims transmissible, culminating in modern 
anonymous debt bonds. When these procedures become simplified and commonly used 
debt notes may acquire a large degree of acceptability making them ever more money-
like. The borderline between financial instruments and monetary instruments then 
becomes blurry. This is what happened in the case of bank notes which emerged as 
anonymous transmissible debt notes but evolved into a particular form of currency 
protected by legal tender laws. 
Roman law did not allow impersonal debts. Therefore debt notes (nomina) could not 
circulate anonymously and were unsuited to function as money. However, presumably 
already in the second century BC, Roman law devised ways to transfer debts, by 
defining so-called nomina transcripticia as constituting legally enforceable obligations 
(obligationes litteris). These were essentially forms of book credit consisting of a record 
in the creditor‟s accounts. Legally, nomina transcripticia constituted a „renewal‟ of 
debt(s) (novatio) that extinguished the previous debts
88
. The procedure allowed various 
solutions to simplify or execute payments. For instance it allowed business partners to 
„balance‟ their accounts, by writing off reciprocal obligations and recording the 
remainder as a new debt
89
. 
Nomina transcripticia could be used to formalize the transfer of debts through 
delegatio debitoris. This was an arrangement by which a debtor A (the delegans) 
ordered a debtor of his own B (the delegatus) to repay his debt by paying a third party C 
(cui delegatum)
90
. Delegatio was considered as a valid payment which discharged the 
delegans (debtor A) of his obligations, even if it later turned out that the delegatus 
(debtor B) was insolvent
91
. Nomina transcripticia were not strictly required, but 
formalized delegationes by creating a new debt between the delegatus and the cui 
delegatum. 
Apart from payment, delegationes could also be used to organise permutationes. 
These were arrangements to transfer funds over long distances, that basically consisted 
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of an „exchange of nomina‟92. Permutatio usually involved three persons : a creditor, 
being in one location X (for instance Rome), a debtor in a distant location Y (for 
instance Alexandria) and a third party who needed (for whichever reason) to transfer 
funds from X (Rome) to Y (Alexandria). The creditor (the delegans) could use a 
delegatio to order his debtor (the delegatus) to pay his debt to the third party or his 
agents in location B (Alexandria). In some cases only two persons were involved, for 
instance when the permutator owned property or had interests in both places. Thus 
Atticus arranged a permutatio for Cicero in Rome by ordering his agent in Ephesus to 
pay Cicero a sum when he arrived there
93
. 
Delegatio depended in principle on the consent of the delegatus (debtor B), but this 
could be circumvented by appointing creditor C (cui delegatum) as procurator (in rem 
suam) for recovering the debt in the name of his initial debtor A (the delegans). Creditor 
C was then able to summon and if necessary to sue his new debtor B (the delegatus), 
formally on behalf of the delegans (debtor A), but in fact on his own behalf
94
.  
The solution was far from perfect, because if the delegatus (debtor B) decided to 
pay his debt to the delegans (debtor A), the debt was extinguished while creditor C had 
already lost his original claim on the delegans (debtor A). This could be avoided by a 
conditional stipulatio that made the delegans and his heirs liable if the delegatus paid 
the debt to his original debtor
95
. But if the delegans was not financially sound or 
trustworthy (which may have been the reason why he decided to resort to delegatio 
debitoris in the first place) creditor C continued to bear the full risk of the debt. 
Moreover, if the delegans (debtor A) died before the debt was paid, the appointment of 
creditor C to procurator in rem suam became invalid
96
. Vice versa, if creditor C died, 
the heirs of the creditor did not inherit the appointment to procurator in rem suam. Last 
but not least, creditor C could not himself delegate the debt claim further because he 
was not its formal creditor. So delegatio debitoris supported only a single transfer.  
Nomina transcripticia offered a solution to these problems. Both A‟s debt to C and 
B‟s debt to A were cancelled by the establishment of a nomen transcripticium recording 
B‟s new debt to C, which in turn could be subject to a delegatio. However, nomina 
transcripticia required the formal consent of all parties involved.  
Delegationes, therefore, were never freely transferable titles to goods and services. 
When Cicero‟s son was studying in Athens, Cicero turned to Atticus for advice : should 
young Cicero carry the money with him to Athens or could a permutatio be arranged 
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with someone in Athens? Atticus managed to arrange a permutatio through an Athenian 
friend, Xeno, who agreed to pay out the money in instalments. It is interesting to note 
that carrying the money along was considered a possible option at all, despite Atticus‟s 
excellent contacts in Athens. Hardly a year later, it appeared that Xeno had been 
negligent in providing Cicero jr. with enough money and Cicero had to ask Atticus to 
intervene
97
.  
Delegationes always appear to have required preliminary negotiations and 
agreements. They could never be taken for granted. Consequently to consider them as 
„credit money‟, as Mrozek and others scholars do, is misleading 98 . They remained 
financial instruments, not monetary instruments.  
Nevertheless, neither should we exaggerate the difficulties involved. The transaction 
costs involved may have been relatively high, but could be reduced by establishing 
relations of mutual trust between the parties involved
99
. Delegationes required networks 
of trust and co-operation to function. Provided these were in place delegationes were 
effective procedures to handle monetized transactions. The procedures needed to 
arrange delegationes and nomina transcripticia became quite common.  
By the late Republic nomina could even be sold. Cicero considered selling a nomen 
to a certain Vettienus at half its nominal value
100
. Ulpianus compares the bequest of a 
debt to the sale of a debt to prove the validity of the former
101
. There can be no doubt 
therefore that delegationes and nomina transcripticia supported the deep monetization 
of Roman society. 
Various legal technicalities were involved in the above procedures, but they all 
hinged on manipulating debit and credit items (nomina) in account books. Such „private 
debt management‟ was a corner stone of the Roman financial and monetary system. 
Between large households and regular business partners, credit exchanges were as 
common in the Roman world as they were in pre-industrial Europe and its Colonies
102
.  
The mechanisms available to sell or otherwise „activate‟ nomina explain the ease 
with which Roman aristocrats contracted debts and invested in loans. The basic 
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principle was that of concurratio nominis : to make sure that debts and credits evened 
out. It was inevitable that debts owed sometimes became due before claims held could 
be recovered. Delegationes or selling of claims then provided ways to avoid having to 
contract new debts (versurae) at unfavourable terms
103
. In 44 BC Cicero ran into 
difficulties because – for some reason – his concurratio nominis had failed. Atticus‟s 
help was called for, who had to find an emergency loan of 200,000 sesterces for a 
period of 5 months, until another debt to Cicero would become due
104
. 
Closely related to private debt management are credit sales. They are extremely 
common in pre-industrial economies and often take place informally for various down 
to earth reasons. In early modern Europe daily purchases were commonly conducted on 
a short-term credit basis (the tally-stick) and paid at more or less regular intervals. It 
allowed customers to delay payment until they had income and it avoided unnecessary 
strains on the supply of small change. For large payments, vendors always had to wait 
for the physical delivery of the purchase sum. If the money had to come from the estates 
of the purchaser (or vice versa from his urban residence), time lags of a few days to a 
few weeks were inevitable. Significantly the second century jurist Pomponius wrote that 
an object sold became the buyer‟s property as soon as the price was paid or the vendor 
had agreed to receive payment later
105
. 
The nature of our evidence for the ancient world makes it difficult to find instances 
of day-to-day customer credits, but they are implicit in Egyptian papyri and we may be 
fairly sure that they occurred also elsewhere
106
. The abundance of gold and to a lesser 
extent silver, may have reduced the need for credit sales somewhat, but small change 
was often in short supply, as may be surmised from the various „ad hoc‟ solutions we 
can observe in the numismatic material, such as cutting coins in half, minting imitations 
and stamping countermarks.  
For large payments sale credit is well documented. When Cicero bought a road-
house (deversorium) from a certain Canuleius in 49 BC through mediation from the 
argentarius (?) Vettienus, the latter notified him that the sale was completed and 
payment was due in seven months
107
. When the Roman knight C. Canius bought a 
property on Sicily the affair is succinctly presented by Cicero as : „He bought it … it 
was noted in the accounts, the deal was struck‟108. When Cicero wanted to buy a villa 
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from his friend Silius, he considered it self-evident that payment could be made in 
instalments providing interest would be paid
109
.  
As in the case of delegationes, nomina transcripticia provided a way to formalise 
sale credit. Once registered as debts and credits in the account books of vendor and 
buyer, sale credit notes could be used in private debt management practices
110
. 
Since the late second century BC, credit facilities at auctions were provided by 
professional bankers ((coactores) argentarii). These were not sale credits stricto sensu – 
the argentarii paid the vendor and noted the amount as due by the buyer
111
. 
Nevertheless, the implication of the argentarii signifies the professionalization of sales 
based on credit arrangements.  
So, although sale credit and private debt management did not increase the available 
money supply, they hugely increased the amount of monetized transactions that could 
take place and thereby greatly increased the degree to which Roman society could be 
structurally monetized. 
Private debt management practices, however, in the ancient world as well as in early 
modern Europe were tied up with the social fabric of credit. By far most credit 
transactions occurred between family, friends or business partners. This does not imply 
that no interest was charged or that the creditor(s) did not profit in other ways, but they 
required networks of personal connections based on trust to function
112
. This 
requirement was alleviated by deposit bankers and financial intermediaries. Before 
turning to these, however, we should first consider the role of internal account rationing. 
Whereas private debt management and sale credit are essentially solutions to handle 
monetized transactions between formally independent actors, account money was a 
decisive factor in the internal monetization of large organizations, like the army or large 
landed estates. 
The Roman army was the most important monetizing factor in the western 
provinces. Although requisitions in kind were common, the camp administration was 
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conducted in money, army pay was expressed in money and most purchases were 
expressed and paid in money
113
.  
The Rhine army, for instance required approximately 89 million sesterces a year in 
the first century and 59 million in the second. The troops stationed Britain required 
about 34 million sesterces before Domitian‟s pay rise and about 45 million afterwards 
These are minimum estimates, not taking into account donatives
114
.  
Only part of this money was actually paid out. Part of the soldier‟s salary was 
deducted to pay for food, clothing and other stuff, part of which came from requisitions 
and taxation in kind. However, papyri show that even the balance was not automatically 
paid in cash. Rather each soldier had an account with the camp‟s financial 
administration from which he could draw money when he wanted or with which he 
could be make purchases in the camp. Since Domitian each soldier had a compulsory 
„savings account‟ in which he could deposit money until the end of his service. In this 
way army life was profoundly monetized far beyond what would have been possible if 
currency had been the only available form of money.  
Similar internal monetization may be found on large estates. Papyri show that 
although country estates in Egypt were run on a monetized basis, in the sense that 
obligations, income and expenditures were expressed in money, not all transactions 
were actually made in cash. Salaried workers were allowed to „buy‟ estate products, the 
price of which (in money) was then debited against their wages (in money). 
Transactions between separate parts of the estate (often located at some kilometres 
distance from each other) each having their own account books were likewise conducted 
through internal account rationing
115
. Unfortunately we have few sources documenting 
how the vast landed estates in the other provinces were managed. Reliefs on inscriptions 
document payment in coin, probably of tenancy leases, but these don‟t preclude account 
rationing for other purposes
116
. 
Both cases show the potential of internal account money. Although internal account 
money in these instances was valid only within the organisation, it shows all the 
features of genuine money and allowed life in the camps and on country estates to be 
structured on a monetary basis. Thus the Roman army and estate management practises 
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served as socialising agents that spread the disposition and habits that underlay deep 
monetization.  
Interestingly, Rathbone argued that at least in a number of cases the Appianus estate 
used professional deposit bankers (trapezitai) to manage account payments between 
separate entities of the estate
117
. This brings us to the question of bank money or the 
existence (or not) of open account money systems. 
Private debt management resembles clearing operations between banks. From an 
economic point of view the difference lies mainly in the fact that bankers are a separate 
category of specialists, who provide their services on a professional basis. Banks 
obviate the need for personal networks between payer and payee, without which private 
account exchanges cannot take place. 
Deposit bankers were ubiquitous throughout the Roman empire. Deposits, payment 
orders and checks (although non transmissible) are well attested in Ptolemaic and 
Roman Egypt
118
 The situation was probably not very different elsewhere, at least in 
Italy and the more urbanized provinces. Roman law defined various specific rules 
applying only to deposit bankers on the grounds of „public utility‟ 119 . Contrary to 
payments by delegatio, for instance, deposit bankers were legally obliged to carry out 
payment orders from their clients
120
. 
We already argued that one important contribution of deposit bankers to the 
monetary system was to facilitate the use of currency. In that role deposit bankers 
contributed to what we called the „currency mode‟. However, their contribution to 
monetization may have stretched further. 
The corner stone of modern banking is fractional reserve banking : using deposited 
sums to extend bank loans. The practice rests on the assumption that most clients are 
most of the time content to leave most of their money at the bank. The banker takes the 
calculated risk to use part of the deposits for his own business purposes. 
Papyri show little trace of trapezitai practicing fractional reserve banking
121
. But if 
this impression is correct for Egypt, it cannot be extended to other parts of the Roman 
world. Several passages in the Digest confirm that deposit bankers used deposited sums 
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to do business and paid interest to their clients
122. Harris notes that „fractional reserve‟ 
banking must have been common in the late Hellenistic age, since the Ephesus debt law 
of 85 BC accords trapezitai a period of 10 year to repay their debts
123
. 
Fractional reserve banking boosts the monetary system by reducing the amount of 
currency lying idle, but does not in itself increase the money supply or change the way 
in which this supply may be used. Although the depositor in theory has an immediate 
claim on his deposits, fractional reserve banking is based on the assumption that he will 
not demand back the deposited sums.  
Bank or giro money is created when a banker executes payment orders not by means 
of cash payments, but by transferring sums between bank accounts. This allows 
payments to take place without the physical use of currency. Combined with fractional 
reserve banking, which allows the banker to lend out deposited sums without affecting 
the account of the depositors, giro transfers create (account) money over and above the 
available currency supply.  
Giro payments are simple in the case of payments between accounts held by the 
same bank, but for payments between clients of different banks, it requires bankers to 
open accounts with other bankers. These accounts can then be indebted whenever a 
payment on behalf of a client of the other banker is made. At regular intervals (monthly, 
yearly) inter-bank accounts are balanced and „cleared‟ by writing off reciprocal debts. 
This is the so-called „clearance system‟. In modern economies central banks and 
specialized clearance agents act as clearance centres, tying the system together. But both 
were absent until well into the 19
th
 century and did not exist in the ancient world.  
Some papyri show that bankers held accounts of their colleagues and could therefore 
have used clearing techniques. Giro payments, however, are poorly documented. Sitta 
von Reden recently argued that „no giro transfer of money from one account to another, 
or between accounts in different banks, is so far attested in Ptolemaic Egypt‟. Positive 
„evidence‟ for Roman Egypt as well is largely lacking 124 . By and large Egyptian 
trapezitai appear to have handled primarily cash payments. 
However, in view of the ubiquity of private debt rationing and payment orders 
through banks, it seems odd that private bankers would not have availed themselves of 
similar techniques as existed for state banks dealing with state funds. Two passages 
from Terentius and Plautus seem to refer to a giro payment. Andreau also showed that 
among the tablets of the Pompeian banker Caecilius Iucundus 12 refer to cash payments 
through Iucundus, 12 to payments between accounts
125
. 
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Probably, therefore, the existence as such of giro transactions should not be doubted. 
Much less clear however, is the volume of these and their reach. The question depends 
on the number of people having bank accounts and the importance of the sums they 
deposited, which is something we will never know. Only one instance is recorded of a 
Roman senator holding a bank account, Scipio Aemilianus in the second century BC
126
. 
Of course this may be due to the hapzardness of our sources, but it should be set off 
against the vast material indicating estate and fortune management through procurators 
and specialised slave paymasters (dispensatores) and accountants (ratiocinarii), which 
indicate that most aristocrats managed their financial affairs themselves. 
The rarity and ambiguity of the available evidence, suggest that the contribution of 
giro transactions was limited. This may have been due in part to the fact that giro 
„money‟ could not rely on general acceptance because the number of people having 
bank accounts and the number of banks having clearance agreements was too small. 
Combined with the lack of clearing centres or national banks and the lack of a legal 
framework ensuring the continuity of a bank‟s operations when the banker died, this 
situation limited the potential for bank money to develop. Consequently, the acceptance 
of giro payments remained limited to specific groups (bank account holders) for intra-
group payments. 
Interestingly, Egyptian papyri indicate that deposit bankers were deeply involved in 
the management of their clients‟ lending and borrowing affairs. They appear to have 
acted as notaries and financial mediators to assist in private account transfers
127
. In this 
respect, however, deposit bankers (trapezitai, argentarii), were not the only specialised 
businessmen whose assistance in financial matters could be called upon. Following 
Andreau‟s lead, I have argued elsewhere that the most important financial 
intermediaries were not deposit bankers but faeneratores
128
. 
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Financial assistance by faeneratores or daneistai in private debt management is well 
attested. They served as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers and commonly 
arranged delegationes debitoris. Papinianus for instance thought that a master was fully 
liable for delegationes accepted by a slave who was appointed only to lend money at 
interest (pecuniis faenerandis). In this view, accepting delegationes was inherent to the 
negotiatio faeneraticia
129
. 
Whereas deposit bankers mostly belonged to the „working classes‟, many credit 
intermediaries belonged to the business elite and were socially closer to the aristocracy. 
This may explain why members of the elite rarely used deposit bankers to handle their 
financial affairs
130
. The expertise and social proximity of high ranking credit 
intermediaries, combined with their own social networks made private debt rationing 
more attractive and profitable for the aristocracy than passively depositing their money 
with a professional banker and allowing the banker free use of the deposited sums. 
Conversely, for businessmen credit mediation was more profitable and less risky than 
deposit banking
131
. 
In times of peace and stability, personal networks, deposit bankers, financial 
intermediaries and legal procedures ensured the reliability of debt and account 
management practices, which limited the need for currency or physical alternatives as 
bullion. In times of crisis, however, credit and account money became risky and 
preference for material media of exchange increased. 
This is particularly visible in the third century, when despite the currency and 
financial crisis, people did not resort to barter, gift exchange or redistributive systems. 
Gold bullion may have stepped in to handle large payments, but as an alternative for 
day-to-day consumer credit it was unsuited. The gargantuan increase of low quality 
denominations and „barbarous‟ imitations indicates a desperate need for transactional 
media that served hand-to-hand transactions; a preference for currency over debt 
management and sale credit. No matter how profound the currency crisis was, the social 
construct of money survived and lay a powerful constraint on economic transactions. 
Conclusion 
I have argued here that in order to understand the Roman monetary system, we need 
to abandon the functionalist approach that has prevailed until now. In stead we need to 
think of money as a social construct that structures exchanges and relations between 
social actors. Money in the conventional sense of the word is merely an instrument used 
to handle monetised transactions. It is the embodiment of generalised rights. Its 
acceptance is socially prescribed and „taught‟ in socialisation. Instead of focusing on 
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„money‟, I have proposed an approach based on the concept of „monetary modes‟, i.e. 
sets of instruments (monetary, financial and other) and procedures to handle monetized 
transactions. 
By the late Republic the Roman monetary system had developed into a complex, 
extensive and flexible system integrating various modes of handling monetised 
transactions, ranging from currency, over bullion to debt and account management. The 
Imperial monetary system ultimately rested on a large stock of gold currency, which 
replaced the Republican stock of gold bullion. Metallic currency was the yard stick for 
monetized transactions. It was the only form of money stricto sensu, that enjoyed a 
general and socially prescribed acceptability. Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
monetized transactions were mostly cash transactions. Sale credit and private debt and 
account transfers, aided by financial intermediaries and deposit bankers, allowed to 
overcome the practical disadvantages of metallic currency.  
An essential aspect of this system was that it was fairly easy to change from one 
monetary (sub)mode to another. Transaction costs in the form of exchange premiums, 
interest charges and commission rates were relatively low, while the volume of 
exchanges was sufficiently large to allow specialised middlemen (bankers and financial 
intermediaries) to operate. The system emerged in the late Republic, was consolidated 
by the Augustan currency system and finally broke down in the course of the 3
rd
 c CE. 
